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Young: Federalism as a Constitutional Principle

FEDERALISM AS A CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE
Ernest Young*

I’m grateful for the opportunity to give the William Howard Taft
Lecture on Constitutional Law. It’s an honor to share a podium with the
likes of Justices Antonin Scalia and Sandra Day O’Connor, as well as
scholars like Vicki Jackson and David Strauss. And it’s always nice (if a
little surprising) to see a bunch of people turn out to hear a talk about
federalism. Justice O’Connor rightly called federalism “our oldest
question of constitutional law.”1 But the constitutional balance between
the nation and the states is hardly what the cool kids are talking about
these days. My first-year con law students show up each Fall expecting
to learn about same-sex marriage, flag burning, and abortion; they’re
plainly disappointed when they pick up the syllabus and see how much
of the course is going to be about government structure.
The first part of my talk resists that intuition. The notion that
federalism is passé is so tragically wrongheaded that I can’t bear to
leave it alone. As we say in North Carolina, “it hurts my heart.” And
thinking about why one should care about federalism can actually tell us
a lot about the meaning of the federalism we have.
The second part of my talk explores how the Constitution protects
federalism. I’ll conclude by addressing what federalism needs to
survive as a constitutional principle.
I. WHY CARE ABOUT FEDERALISM?
So why care about federalism? I confess that I started down the road
of my life’s scholarly work out of sheer orneriness and irritation. (This
admission will probably not surprise my family members that are here
today.) The irritation arose because even though federalism is plainly an
important constitutional principle both textually and historically, lots of
smart and powerful people seem to think it’s OK to ignore it.
Consider the oral argument in United States v. Lopez,2 which the
Supreme Court decided in 1995. Alphonso Lopez was convicted under
the federal Gun Free School Zones Act, which made it a federal crime to
* Alston & Bird Professor, Duke Law School. This essay was presented as the William Howard
Taft Lecture on Constitutional Law at the University of Cincinnati College of Law on October 28, 2014.
The present version has been annotated and lightly edited from the original text. I am grateful to the
Dean Louis Bilionis and the College of Law for inviting me to give the lecture, to the Law Review for
printing it, and to the Blondel, Gerak, and Marchione families of Cleveland, Canton, and Dayton, who
have given me such good reasons to feel at home in Ohio.
1. N.Y. v. U.S., 505 U.S. 144, 149 (1992).
2. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
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possess a gun within 1000 feet of a school. Lopez argued that the Act
exceeded Congress’s legislative power under the Commerce Clause. It
seemed like a pretty good argument: the statute required neither a
commercial transaction nor any sort of interstate travel, so how could it
rest on Congress’s power to regulate “commerce . . . among the several
states”?
At oral argument, Justice O’Connor asked a critically important
question to Solicitor General Drew Days, who was defending the statute.
She asked whether, if the Gun Free School Zones Act were
constitutional, there would be anything left that Congress could not
regulate. General Days responded that he was “not prepared to
speculate generally.”3 Translation: He hadn’t really thought about the
question.
It wasn’t a good answer. In those days, Justice O’Connor might as
well have had a big red “5” tattooed on her forehead. If the United
States couldn’t identify any limits on its own power under its
interpretation of the Commerce Clause, then that interpretation was
going down. But you can understand why General Days wasn’t
prepared to answer: After all, the Court had not struck a federal statute
on the ground that it exceeded Congress’s Commerce Power since the
“switch in time” way back in 1937.4 Days evidently thought, with some
justification, that Mr. Lopez’s quaint invocation of the doctrine of
enumerated powers could simply be given the back of the hand. Four
justices—including my justice, David Souter, who was obviously the
smartest of them all—agreed with him.5 And the overwhelming
majority of legal academics—who by definition are smarter than
everybody—trashed the Court’s decision striking down the Gun Free
School Zones Act as some kind of Neanderthal outburst of a
conservative court that hadn’t gotten the memo about the New Deal or
the nature of modern society.6
As a young lawyer, I just couldn’t wrap my head around the notion
that the principle of enumerated powers could simply be read out of the
Constitution because it seemed inconvenient or outdated. It bugged me.

3. Transcript of Oral Argument at 7, Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (No. 93-1260).
4. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (changing course from earlier
rulings and upholding broad federal regulation of the economy); see also ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE
AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 117–19 (Sanford Levinson ed., 4th ed. 2005) (discussing the end of the era
of judicial enforcement of limits on national authority).
5. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 603 (Souter, J., dissenting); id. at 615 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
6. See, e.g., Charles E. Ares, Lopez and the Future Constitutional Crisis, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 825,
826 (1996) (arguing that the Court had “opened the floodgates . . . to begin the process of dismantling”
national intrusions on state autonomy). In fact, Sylvia Law issued one of the most dramatic indictments
from this very podium. See Sylvia A. Law, In the Name of Federalism: The Supreme Court’s Assault
on Democracy and Civil Rights, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 267 (2002) (William Howard Taft Lecture).
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So the first reason to care about federalism is that, well, federalism is in
the Constitution. This is the argument from constitutional fidelity. 7 We
don’t get to treat the Constitution the way a six-year-old treats a slice of
pizza—picking off the good parts, like the Free Speech or Equal
Protection Clauses—and throwing out the rest.8
I think fidelity is enough to justify the Court’s holding in Lopez: That
was a case in which the only alternative to striking down the law was
really to admit, as General Days implicitly conceded, that there were no
real limits on Congress’s powers anymore.9 But most federalism
questions are harder than that. The Constitution’s federalism provisions
are often ambiguous, and they leave a lot to be inferred from the general
structure. The bare notion of fidelity can tell us that those provisions
and principles must mean something, but it provides little guidance
about exactly what they mean.10
We need to dig a little deeper. The Founding Generation thought that
federalism is critical to liberty. The Federalists came to Philadelphia
focused on strengthening the central government, in part to rein in
oppressive tendencies in the States.11 But to the extent that Alexander
Hamilton, James Madison and the rest initially sought to subordinate the
States to the national government—for instance, by proposing a
congressional “negative” on state laws—they plainly lost that fight.12
The Antifederalists who worried about national consolidation better
captured American public opinion,13 and by the time Madison sat down
to write Federalist 51 he was extolling federalism as half of the “double
7. See generally Ernest A. Young, The Conservative Case for Federalism, 74 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 874, 877–80 (2006) (developing this argument).
8. See also Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal and Territorial States: The
Constitutional Foundations of Choice of Law, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 249, 267 (1992) (“[W]e should take
the whole Constitution seriously. We cannot legitimately pick and choose the clauses we want
enforced.”).
9. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564 (“Under the theories that the Government presents . . . it is
difficult to perceive any limitation on federal power, even in areas such as criminal law enforcement or
education where States historically have been sovereign. Thus, if we were to accept the Government's
arguments, we are hard pressed to posit any activity by an individual that Congress is without power to
regulate.”).
10. See Young, supra note 7, at 879–80.
11. See JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE
CONSTITUTION 168–69 (1996).
12. See id. at 170–80.
13. See GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at (1969)
(“Under this Antifederalist pressure most Federalists were compelled to concede that if the adoption of
the Constitution would eventually destroy the states and produce a consolidation, then the ‘objection’
was not only ‘of very great force’ but indeed ‘insuperable.’”); Mark R. Killenbeck, Pursuing the Great
Experiment: Reserved Powers in a Post-Ratification, Compound Republic, 1999 SUP. CT. REV. 81, 107
(observing that the Antifederalists’ “concerns were widely shared, and these individuals payed an
important role in shaping the text, the ratification dialogues, and, eventually, the drafting and ratification
of what became the Tenth Amendment”).
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security” that the Constitution provides for liberty. 14
States protect liberty in several different ways. First, they can be a
rallying point for opposition to federal policies that threaten individual
rights. Think of the Virginia and Kentucky legislatures, which passed
resolutions opposing the Alien and Sedition Acts at the end of the 18 th
century.15 Those resolutions involved speech by states, which will often
have a bigger and more effective voice than individuals and private
organizations. But sometimes state opposition takes the form of noncooperation with federal laws, like the many states and localities that
refused to implement certain aspects of the Patriot Act just a decade
ago.16
The second point is that state-based dissent has a unique quality,
because states are not simply speakers but also institutions that exercise
power. If groups that are in the minority nationally find themselves in
the majority within a particular state, they can actually implement their
views under state law. Think of proponents of same-sex marriage, who
for most of the past two decades have been on the short end at the
national level but have had majorities in states like Vermont or New
York. That meant that proponents could not only criticize national
opposition to same-sex marriage, but actually give legalization a shot
within their own jurisdiction.17 My friend Heather Gerken calls this
“dissenting by deciding.”18 It’s often far more effective than regular
dissent, because it gives minorities a chance to demonstrate that the sky
won’t fall if they get their way.
By giving groups that are out of power at the national level a chance
to exercise power in a state, federalism protects liberty in a third way: by
fostering political circulation. Democracies lose their freedom when a
particular party or group secures a permanent lock on power. One way
that can happen is if the opposition can’t demonstrate a credible ability
to govern. Think of the Labor Party in England, which was a voice
crying in the wilderness for nearly two decades during the 80s and 90s.
British opposition parties don’t get to run anything, and so it’s hard to
demonstrate that their policies will work. But in America, the out-party
in Washington will always be running any number of states, and
politicians from those states can run for national office on a record of
actual governing experience and achievement. It’s no coincidence that
14. See FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 318, 321 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick, ed. 1987).
15. See, e.g., Wayne D. Moore, Reconceiving Interpretive Autonomy: Insights from the Virginia
and Kentucky Resolutions, 11 CONST. COMMENTARY 315 (1994).
16. See, e.g., Ann Althouse, The Vigor of Anti-commandeering Doctrine in Times of Terror, 69
BROOKLYN L. REV. 1231 (2004) (discussing state and local noncooperation with the Patriot Act).
17. See generally See, e.g., Ernest A. Young, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty as Federalism Strategies:
Lessons from the Same-Sex Marriage Debate, 85 U. COLO. L. REV. 1133 (2014).
18. See Heather K. Gerken, Dissenting by Deciding, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1745 (2005).
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four of our last six presidents were governors of their states during a
period when their party was out of power in Washington, D.C.19
We should remember that the core of the Framers’ political theory—
as expressed in documents like Federalist 10 and 51—placed little
weight on individual rights and judicial review as securities for liberty.20
They thought that if you get the structure of the government right, then
government will be unlikely—even unable—to behave tyrannically. It’s
easy to forget that nowadays, when the courts play a prominent role and
we cherish legal rights like speech and religious exercise. But keep in
mind that constitutions in the Soviet Union and other tyrannies
purported to guarantee similar rights. Those guarantees weren’t worth
the paper they were written on, because the structure of those
governments neither permitted the People to control the Government nor
obliged it to control itself.21
A third and related reason to care about federalism is that Federalism
fosters pluralism. Sometimes critics attempt to portray federalism as a
vestige of days gone by. Maybe federalism made sense to Thomas
Jefferson’s yeoman farmers, whose world was relatively agrarian and
homogeneous, but it’s out of place in modern society. 22 I submit that
absolutely the contrary is true: the need for federalism has radically
increased as the world has become more diverse, complex, and
interconnected.
Consider our most pressing social issue of the moment—the
legitimacy of same-sex marriage. That issue is not, to put it mildly,
something that our Founders had on their minds when they conceived
our federal Union. It arises because modern society recognizes as
legitimate a radically broader range of beliefs, lifestyles, and ways of
being than our forebears did. But because we are diverse, there simply
is no national consensus on this issue in popular morality and opinion.23
Perhaps a uniform national answer can be derived from the text,
structure, and theory of the Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses24—but it is anyone’s guess whether a resolution of the issue by
19. See Ernest A. Young, Welcome to the Dark Side: Liberals Rediscover Federalism in the
Wake of the War on Terror, 69 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1277, 1286–87 (2004).
20. See Ernest A. Young, Two Cheers for Process Federalism, 46 VILL. L. REV. 1349, 1353–55
(2001).
21. See Antonin Scalia, Foreword: The Importance of Structure in Constitutional Interpretation,
83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1417, 1418 (2008).
22. See, e.g., MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD RUBIN, FEDERALISM: NATIONAL IDENTITY AND
TRAGIC COMPROMISE (2008).
23. See, e.g., Public Sees Religious Influence Waning, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Sept. 22, 2014),
http://www.pewforum.org/2014/09/22/public-sees-religions-influence-waning-2/ (finding “a slight drop
in support for allowing gays and lesbians to marry, with 49% of Americans in favor and 41% opposed”).
24. By the time this lecture appears in print, the Supreme Court is likely to have ruled on the
question. See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 1039 (2015) (No. 14-556) (granting consolidation
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judicial opinion (by a Supreme Court that would itself surely be closely
divided on the question) would be perceived as legitimate by the
roughly half of Americans that would wind up on the losing end.
Federalism provides a way forward in these scenarios of profound
national division. Proponents and opponents of same-sex marriage are
not evenly distributed geographically, and in different states different
sides have found themselves in the majority. A few states, like New
York, have adopted same-sex marriage through legislation; others, like
Massachusetts, have adopted it through state courts’ construction of
their own state constitutional traditions. Many other states, including
my own North Carolina, have gone the opposite way through state
constitutional amendment.25 Our federalism has permitted a pluralist
response to the matter that reflects the underlying lack of national
consensus far better than would a nation-wide up-or-down vote on the
question.26
Or take another issue: pollution and environmental degradation.
Environmental issues are the poster-children for uniform national
regulation; after all, the effects of pollution do not respect state borders.
But we don’t actually regulate environmental matters in a nationally
uniform way. Under the Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act, and many
other federal statutes, federal authorities set pollution targets but
responsibility for development and implementation of regulatory plans
to reach those targets is left to the States.27 Why? Because
environmental problems are so complex, so variegated by geography,
and require so many governmental resources to address that a purely
federal response would be overwhelmed. This situation recurs across
most federal regulatory regimes. The complexity of modern problems
does not render federalism obsolete—it makes federalism essential.
My final point is that federalism is current. One might even venture
to say “trendy.” Think about Scotland over the summer, where
thousands of youngish Scots painted their faces blue and talked
“secession” like some weird combination of William Wallace and
Jefferson Davis. The Scottish secession referendum failed, but it might
well have succeeded if the British government had not offered major
guarantees of Scottish autonomy going forward, effectively lurching
toward a federal system in fact.28 And a majority of Scots between the
and certiorari for four related cases addressing same-sex marriage).
25. See generally Research Guides: Same-Sex Marriage Laws, THE OHIO STATE UNIV. MORITZ
COLL. OF L., http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/library/samesexmarriagelaws.php (last visited Feb. 26, 2015).
26. On the ways in which state-by-state diversity may ultimately help the cause of same-sex
marriage, see Young, supra note 17.
27. See, e.g., John P. Dwyer, The Practice of Federalism Under the Clean Air Act, 54 MD. L.
REV. 1183 (1995).
28. See
After
the
No
Vote,
THE
ECONOMIST
(Sept.
19,
2014),
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ages of 16 and 24 seems to have voted in favor of secession. 29 I n
Glasgow, if not in Cincinnati or Durham, federalism is what the cool
kids are talking about these days.30
More broadly, contemporary Europe has been conducting the most
interesting federal experiment in the world, and the Euro crisis has
thrown the tensions in the EU’s federal scheme into high relief. It is
1790 all over again over there, with Angela Merkel playing Alexander
Hamilton, seeking to bind the member states together more closely by
having the central government guarantee their debts, and David
Cameron playing Thomas Jefferson and worrying about the politicallycentralizing tendencies of it all. Some Europeans like federalism and
some think of it as “the F word,” but no one thinks it is boring or
passé.31
But we can also look closer to home. High-profile contemporary
American conflicts about healthcare, immigration, and even climate
change have all played out on the legal terrain of federalism, with
individual states like Virginia, Arizona, and California, respectively,
wanting to go their own way out of dissatisfaction with national policy.
Or consider the legalization of recreational marijuana use in Washington
and Colorado. I was taught in school that Andrew Jackson put to rest
any suggestion that individual states have the power to “nullify” federal
laws, but Colorado’s new version of “Rocky Mountain High” is
demonstrating that a state may establish an extensive legal regime and a
vibrant new industry predicated on the legality of an activity that federal
law forbids.32 The reason this works is that enforcement of national
drug laws effectively depends, in most instances, on the cooperation and
resources of state and local law enforcement. If a state opts out, there’s
not a whole lot the Feds can do a massive commitment of federal
http://www.economist.com/blogs/blighty/2014/09/scotlands-referendum-1 (discussing efforts “to crack
on with the promised devolution” that the U.K. government assured Scotland would occur if it remained
in the Union, and concluding that “the United Kingdom will stay united. But it will also be looser and
constitutionally messier than in the past”).
29. See Christine Jeavans, In maps: How close was the Scottish referendum vote? BBC NEWS
(Sept. 19, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-29255449.
30. And in Barcelona, too. See Simon Worrall, Will Catalonia Hold a Referendum on Whether to
Break
Away
from
Spain?
NATIONAL
GEOGRAPHIC
(Oct.
11,
2014),
http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2014/10/141011-spain-catalonia-barcelona-madridindependence/.
31. See generally Ernest A. Young, The European Union: A Comparative Perspective, 1
OXFORD GUIDE TO EUROPEAN LAW (forthcoming 2015); Paul P. Craig, Economic Governance and the
Euro Crisis: Constitutional Architecture and Constitutional Implications, in THE
CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF EUROPEAN BUDGETARY CONSTRAINTS (2014).
32. See Ernest A. Young, Modern-Day Nullification: Marijuana and the Persistence of
Federalism in an Age of Overlapping Regulatory Jurisdiction, CASE WES. U. L. REV. (forthcoming
2015); Robert A. Mikos, On the Limits of Supremacy:Medical Marijuana and the States’ Overlooked
Power to Legalize Federal Crime, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1421 (2009).
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resources. Whatever one thinks of legalizing marijuana, there is no
doubt that federalism is, literally, ripped from today’s headlines.
II. HOW DOES CONSTITUTIONAL LAW PROTECT FEDERALISM?
I want to turn now to constitutional theory and doctrine.
Part of what it means to say that federalism is a constitutional
principle is that it is a creature of the law. But understanding federalism
is not simply a matter of divining what the law requires. We are not
looking for rules to write down in our Con Law outlines. I want to think
of federalism as an institutional puzzle to be solved. We have a
constitutional commitment to have a national government and at the
same time to have states. We know that each of those two levels of
institutions should have important powers and play important roles in
government. But we also know that historical, political, social, and
economic pressures constantly threaten to undermine this arrangement.
And finally we know that each of the institutional approaches we might
adopt to preserve our federalism—whether it is judicial review, political
representation, or electoral competition—has its upsides and its
downsides.33
We need to think about federalism as a question of strategy. What is
the best approach, all things considered, to governing the relationship
between the national government and the States? When we think of the
problem this way, three things become apparent. First, the Constitution
itself is open to multiple strategies for protecting federalism. Second,
our law has emphasized different strategies at different times over the
course of our history. And third, none of these strategies is perfect.
A. Enumerated Powers and Dual Federalism
The original constitutional strategy for limiting national power and
protecting state autonomy was the doctrine of enumerated powers.34
Article I, Section 8 lists explicitly confers certain powers on Congress;
the Tenth Amendment then makes clear that the enumerated powers are
it; whatever powers the Constitution doesn’t confer remain with the
States.35

33. See generally Ernest A. Young, Making Federalism Doctrine: Fidelity, Institutional
Competence, and Compensating Adjustments, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1733, 1815–48 (2005)
(exploring these institutional issues).
34. See, e.g., FEDERALIST NO. 46, at 296 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick, ed. 1987) (“The
powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal government are few and defined.”).
35. See, e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 195 (1824) (“The enumeration
presupposes something not enumerated.”).
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Enumerated powers gave rise to a model of federalism doctrine called
“dual federalism,” and it worked well enough for the first century and a
half of our history. The grant of certain powers to the national
government and the reservation of the rest to the States created two
separate and exclusive spheres of regulatory jurisdiction.36 The federal
government was not allowed to intrude on the States’ reserved sphere by
trying to regulate education or family law or intrastate commerce, and
the States were equally prohibited from sticking their noses into the
federal sphere by acting in foreign affairs or regulating commerce that
crosses state lines. Critically, the Supreme Court kept watch over the
boundary, striking down actions by either level of government that
crossed over into the other government’s sphere.
The trouble with this strategy was threefold. The first problem was
that expansionary possibilities were built into the Constitution right
alongside the enumerated powers idea. Most obviously, the Necessary
and Proper Clause opened the door to implied powers, like the power to
create a national bank, when those powers were used in support of the
governmental purposes enumerated in Article I. The Supreme Court
construed the necessary and proper provision quite broadly in
McCulloch v. Maryland,37 although Congress didn’t really use it very
broadly until the New Deal. As John Marshall pointed out in
McCulloch, some notion of implied powers is both necessary and
inevitable, because we can’t expect the constitutional drafters to
anticipate every necessity that might come up in the future.38 But he
also recognized that opening the door to implication critically
undermines enumeration as a strategy for confining national power.39
The trouble with McCulloch is not that it was wrongly decided—it was
plainly right—but rather that later readers of Chief Justice Marshall’s
opinion have taken his broad formulation of implied powers and run
with it while ignoring his cautions about the continuing need for limits.
Potential for expansion was also built into the enumerated powers
themselves—particularly Congress’s power to regulate “commerce . . .
among the several states.”40 The Founders probably meant this to cover
two things: actual movements across state lines, like the steamboats on
36. Se, e.g., Alpheus Thomas Mason, The Role of the Court, in FEDERALISM: INFINITE VARIETY
THEORY AND PRACTICE 8, 24–25 (Valerie A. Earle, ed., 1968) (observing that “dual federalism”
contemplated “two mutually exclusive, reciprocally limiting fields of power—that of the national
government and of the States. The two authorities confront[ed] each other as equals across a precise
constitutional line, defining their respective jurisdictions”).
37. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
38. See id. at 406–09.
39. See id. at 423 (recognizing that “congress, under the pretext of executing its powers” might
seek to “pass laws for the accomplishment of objects not intrusted to the government”).
40. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8.
IN
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the Hudson River in Gibbons v. Ogden,41 and the buying and selling of
goods.42 But it seems artificial today to draw a line between, say, the
sale of a good and the manufacture of that good for sale, and so the word
“commerce” came to cover all phases of economic activity leading up to
a commercial transaction.43 And it’s equally unrealistic to try to cordon
off “intrastate” from “interstate” commerce. Even in the Founders’ day,
the price of wheat in Pennsylvania critically affected the price of bread
in New York City. And so “commerce . . . among the several states”
eventually came to cover pretty much all commerce.44 These were all
natural moves, and I don’t really disagree with any of them. But they did
mean that the Commerce Clause became largely equivalent to a national
police power over just about all activities of life.45 Chief Justice
Marshall’s warning in Gibbons that “the enumeration [of national
powers] presupposes something not enumerated” largely got lost.
That’s why Solicitor General Days was so dumbfounded by Justice
O’Connor’s question in Lopez about whether there’s anything left that
Congress can’t regulate.
The second problem was that Congress figured out ways to work
around whatever limits on its power did exist. Congress could use its
prerogative to grant or withhold federal benefits to the States in order to
get them to do stuff that Congress lacked power to order directly.46
After the Sixteenth Amendment’s provision for an income tax vastly
expanded the national government’s financial resources, Congress was
able to use the promise of federal funding to get the States to do all sorts
of things that Congress could not directly mandate. Programs like the
No Child Left Behind Act’s education reforms,47 which lack an obvious
connection to commerce and interfere with traditional state primacy
over education, are structured as conditions on the grant of federal
monies to state and local governments. In the rare cases that
enumerated powers don’t cover something Congress wants to do, it can
usually get its way indirectly via the Spending Power. 48
The third problem was that the dual federalism regime put a great
deal of pressure on courts’ ability to draw bright lines between state and
41. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
42. See, e.g., U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 585-86 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) (canvassing
Founding-era sources).
43. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel, 301 U.S. 1, 40–41 (1937).
44. See U.S. v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 118 (1941).
45. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
46. See, e.g., Lynn A. Baker, Conditional Federal Spending after Lopez, 95 COLUM. L. REV.
1911 (1995) (arguing that the Spending Power offers an end run around other limits on Congress’s
power).
47. See Pub. L. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (Jan. 8, 2002).
48. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
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national power. The distinctions became finer and finer; by the end of
the 19th century, the Court had acknowledged that everything
government does “affects” interstate commerce, and the legality of a
national law would turn on whether that effect was “direct” or
“indirect.”49 Amorphous standards lead to inconsistent results, and
inconsistent application leads to charges that the courts are simply
upholding programs they like and striking down those they don’t.50
When the Court struck down the National Industrial Recovery Act and
other important New Deal programs, President Roosevelt criticized the
Court in a fireside chat.51 He read out quotations from the Court’s own
dissenting justices, whose arguments that the laws were constitutional
sounded just as plausible as the majority’s arguments they were not. 52
Basically, the legal distinctions seemed so arbitrary that it was hard to
defend the Court as relying on law rather than politics. And when
judges act like politicians, people tend to prefer the politicians they
actually get to vote for.
For all these reasons, the constitutional model of dual federalism died
out around 1937, a casualty of the Supreme Court’s “switch in time”
that staved off FDR’s court packing plan by ending the Court’s
resistance to the New Deal.53 Although we still see enumerated powers
cases from time to time—United States v. Lopez54 is the best example—
the death of dual federalism meant that the Court would no longer try to
define a sphere of exclusive state autonomy into which the feds could
not intrude.
We’re generally inclined to think of the Constitution as perfect, or at
least highly successful, but I think the only fair conclusion is that the
enumerated powers strategy for protecting federalism had failed.
B. Concurrent Jurisdiction
That hardly means, however, that federalism is dead. It just means
that contemporary federalism is different. And in many ways, it’s a lot
more interesting. Contemporary federalism begins by replacing the
model of dual federalism with one of concurrent jurisdiction.55 Both the
49. See, e.g., U.S. v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
50. See generally Lawrence Lessig, Translating Federalism: United States v. Lopez, 1995 SUP.
CT. REV. 125, 170–71, 174.
51. See Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Fireside Chat on Reorganization of the Judiciary (March 9,
1937).
52. See id.
53. See Edward S. Corwin, The Passing of Dual Federalism, 36 VA. L. REV. 1 (1950).
54. 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (striking down the federal Gun Free School Zones Act as outside the
commerce power).
55. See generally Ernest A. Young, The Puzzling Persistence of Dual Federalism, in NOMOS
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national government and the states can regulate most subjects; there are
few, if any, exclusive zones of state or national power. Nowadays, all
sorts of federal laws regulate areas formerly reserved to the states, from
family law to education to small-time drug offenses that never go near a
state border.56 And the states get involved in things like immigration or
promoting foreign trade that formerly would have been reserved to
national authorities.57
In a concurrent jurisdiction model, the dominant principle is not the
Tenth Amendment but the Supremacy Clause, which says that validlyenacted federal laws prevail over contrary state law.58 This could
simply be a recipe for the nationalization of American law and politics,
but it doesn’t have to be. Three questions are critical to the vitality of
federalism in this new regime: Who makes federal law, and how easy is
it to make? How readily do we find conflicts between federal and state
law? And who enforces federal law?
1. Making Federal Law: Of Political and Procedural Safeguards
Start with the making of federal law. At the beginning of the
concurrent era, Professor Henry Hart wrote that
Federal law is generally interstitial in its nature. It rarely occupies
a legal field completely, totally excluding all participation by the
legal systems of the states. . . . Congress acts, in short, against the
background of the total corpus juris of the states in much the way
that a state legislature acts against the background of the common
law, assumed to govern unless changed by legislation.59
In other words, the fact that an issue falls within Congress’s regulatory
jurisdiction hardly means that it will be governed by federal law.
Federal law displaces state law only when a political coalition decides to
regulate at the national level and manages to push its proposal through
the procedural gauntlet that Article I prescribes for enacting federal
LV: FEDERALISM AND SUBSIDIARITY 34 (James E. Fleming & Jacob T. Levy eds., 2014).
56. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (permitting federal regulation of individual
consumption of homegrown medicinal marijuana).
57. See, e.g., Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968 (2011) (upholding Arizona law
regulating employment of undocumented immigrants); Julian Ku, Gubernatorial Foreign Policy, 115
YALE L. J. 2380 (2006).
58. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (stating that “this Constitution, and the Laws of the United
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made . . . shall be the supreme Law of
the Land”).
59. RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., JOHN F. MANNING, DANIEL J. MELTZER, & DAVID L. SHAPIRO,
HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 459 (6th ed. 2009) (quoting
the first edition, published in 1953); see also Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations Between State and
Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 489 (1954).
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statutes.60
The constitutional lawmaking process builds in two distinct sets of
safeguards for state autonomy. One is the States’ representation in
Congress. Commentators from James Madison in the 18th Century down
to Herbert Wechsler in the 20th have argued that members of Congress
can be relied upon to protect the states’ interests; as Wechsler
emphasized, Congress can act only when the states’ representatives have
“acquiesced” in the federal proposal.61 More recent work on federalism
questions this assumption, pointing out that while federal representatives
surely care about the political interests in their districts, we can’t assume
that they care about the institutional interests of state governments.62
But it seems likely that the “political safeguards of federalism” do
operate to protect state governmental prerogatives at least some of the
time.
The more effective protection may arise simply from the procedural
difficulty of enacting federal statutes.63 Federal legislation is often
thwarted by the sheer number of hoops that bills must jump through and
the many opportunity those hoops afford for opponents to derail a
legislative proposal. As anyone who watched the “I’m Just a Bill”
cartoon growing up can tell you, it’s a long way to Capitol Hill and lots
can go wrong once you get there.64 We might call these obstacles “the
procedural safeguards of federalism.”65
Political and procedural safeguards help maintain federal law’s
interstitial character. Congress has managed to enact a lot of statutes
since Professor Hart wrote in 1953, but state law continues to govern
important areas of American life. Most of the first year law school
curriculum—contracts, torts, property, criminal law—falls in this
category.66 And while these safeguards are hardly perfect, they do point
60. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7.
61. See Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the
Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM, L. REV. 543 (1954); THE
FEDERALIST NO. 45, at 294–95 (James Madison) (Issac Kramnick, ed. 1987).
62. See, e.g., Lynn A. Baker & Ernest A. Young, Federalism and the Double Standard of
Judicial Review, 51 DUKE L. J. 75, 113–15 (2001); Larry D. Kramer, Understanding Federalism, 47
VAND. L. REV. 1485, 1510–11 (1994).
63. See Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79 TEX. L. REV.
1321, 1339–40 (2001).
64. See Dave Frishberg, I’m Just a Bill, in SCHOOLHOUSE ROCK! (30th Anniversary ed. 2002);
but see Saturday Night Live: Capitol Hill Cold Open (NBC television broadcast Nov. 23, 2014),
available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JUDSeb2zHQ0 (suggesting that President Obama’s use
of executive orders to change federal immigration law has revamped the federal legislative process).
65. See Bradford R. Clark, The Procedural Safeguards of Federalism, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1681 (2008).
66. I am indebted to Douglas Laycock for this observation. One could quibble: In addition to the
state-law dominated subjects of Contracts, Torts, and Property, Duke’s first year curriculum covers
Constitutional Law (federal), Civil Procedure (federal), Criminal Law (mostly the Model Penal Code,
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toward an alternative model for contemporary federalism to replace the
old notion of dual federalism.
The primary thrust of a political and procedural model of federalism
would be to insist that Congress make federal law. The political
safeguards of federalism can’t protect states if Congress doesn’t make
the laws. And yet, most federal law isn’t made by Congress anymore—
it’s made by federal administrative agencies.67 (If you don’t believe me,
walk over to the law library and compare the shelf space devoted to the
U.S. Code to that taken up by the Code of Federal Regulations and the
Federal Register.) The States have no built-in representation in the
federal rulemaking process. And a big reason we use administrative
agencies is that they can make law so much more easily than Congress.
That’s great for responding quickly to complex problems; it’s terrible
for protecting state autonomy.68
We could say much the same thing about the other form of federal
lawmaking that circumvents Congress—the creation of federal common
law by federal courts. Federal judges certainly don’t represent states,
and they face even fewer procedural constraints on lawmaking than
agencies do. The Court recognized the danger of federal judicial
lawmaking to state autonomy when it held in Erie Railroad v.
Tompkins69 that “[e]xcept in matters governed by the Federal
Constitution or by acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is
the law of the state. . . . There is no federal general common law.”70
We don’t teach Erie in Constitutional Law, and most people think of it
as a civil procedure case. But Erie is arguably the most important
federalism decision of the 20th century, because it sums up the basic
strategy of contemporary federalism doctrine: State law can be displaced
only when Congress, which represents the states and can act only with
considerable difficulty, has made the decision to do so.71

with significant elements of federal procedural law thrown in). Many law schools now throw in another
primarily federal course on legislation and regulation. See, e.g., LISA SCHULTZ BRESSMAN, EDWARD
RUBIN, & KEVIN STACK, THE REGULATORY STATE (2d ed. 2013).
67. See, e.g., INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 985–86 (1983) (White, J., dissenting) (“For some
time, the sheer amount of law—the substantive rules that regulate private conduct and direct the
operation of government—made by the agencies has far outnumbered the lawmaking engaged in by
Congress through the traditional process.”).
68. See Ernest A. Young, Executive Preemption, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 869 (2008); Clark, supra
note 63, at 430–38.
69. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
70. Id. at 78.
71. See generally Ernest A. Young, A General Defense of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 10 J.
L. ECON. & POL’Y 17, 18 (2013).
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2. Conflicts Between Federal and State Law
Of course, when Congress does validly enact a federal law, that law
trumps state law in the event of a conflict. And so the second critical
consideration in a concurrent jurisdiction regime concerns the rules for
determining whether such conflicts exist. Those rules all under the
doctrine of preemption—a topic that even most federalism experts
consider boring. (Just stop for a moment and consider how boring
something like that would have to be.)
Let me give you an example: In 2001, the Supreme Court decided a
quiet little case called Egelhoff v. Egelhoff,72 which concerned whether
the beneficiary rules of a pension plan established under the federal
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) trumped a
Washington statute providing that designation of a spouse as a
beneficiary of a nonprobate asset was automatically revoked upon
divorce. It just doesn’t get any more exciting than that, right? But in
dissent, Justice Stephen Breyer stepped back for a moment to discuss the
broader importance of statutory preemption cases for federalism. He
stressed “the practical importance of preserving local independence, at
retail, that is, by applying pre-emption analysis with care, statute by
statute, line by line, in order to determine how best to reconcile a federal
statute’s language and purpose with federalism’s need to preserve state
autonomy.”73 This task, Breyer suggested, is more consequential for
federalism than “the occasional constitutional effort to trim Congress’
commerce power at its edges” or “to protect a State’s treasury from a
private damages action.”74 He concluded that “in today’s world, filled
with legal complexity, the true test of federalist principle may lie . . . in
those many statutory cases where courts interpret the mass of technical
detail that is the ordinary diet of the law.”75
I submit that Justice Breyer’s statement is one of the most important
things the Court has said about federalism in a very long time. In a
world of concurrent jurisdiction state law can coexist with federal law,
but must give way in the event of a conflict. So how often we find such
conflicts largely determines how much room there will be for state law.
Conflicts occur either when Congress intends to displace or preempt
state law, or when state law gets in the way of what Congress is trying to

72. 532 U.S. 141 (2001).
73. Id. at 160 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
74. Id. at 160-61 (citing U.S. v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (striking down part of the federal
Violence Against Women Act as outside Congress’s commerce power), and Board of Trustees of the
University of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (holding that state sovereign immunity barred
damages suits against a state government under the Americans with Disabilities Act)).
75. Id.
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achieve.76 But Congress’s intent is often ambiguous, and preemption
doctrine is concerned mostly with establishing default rules to deal with
these ambiguous cases. How clearly must Congress speak in order to
display its intent to preempt state law? How much of a conflict must
exist before state law must give way?
Two things are worth noting here. First, although preemption is a
constitutional principle in the sense that it derives from the Supremacy
Clause, all the interesting questions in preemption cases concern the
meaning of federal statutes. In fact, it is not too much to say that, in
many if not most cases, the boundary between state and federal authority
in most practical settings nowadays is determined by federal statutes,
not constitutional principle.77 The question is not generally how far did
Congress have constitutional power to go, but rather how far did
Congress intend to go in displacing state law.
Second, these questions are often highly technical—like the ERISA
question in Egelhoff. They involve, as Justice Breyer said, “the mass of
technical detail that is the ordinary diet of the law.” Major preemption
cases over the past decade or so have concerned the intricacies of
Congress’s regulatory regime for medical drugs and devices,78 the
federal air bag rules for minivans,79 and safety measures required under
state and federal law for oil tankers navigating in Puget Sound. 80 But
although these cases are a nerd’s banquet, the stance that the Court takes
toward statutory preemption cases probably has a greater impact on the
federal balance than the grand clash of constitutional principles in a case
like United States v. Lopez.81 Not only do preemption cases tend to
involve issues of greater practical importance, but there are also just a
whole lot more of them. The Supreme Court decided five preemption
cases, for example, in the 2010 Term alone.82 Preemption is, by a
considerable margin, the most common constitutional claim in civil
litigation.
The way that the modern Court has approached preemption cases
illustrates an important point about federalism doctrine in a world of
concurrent jurisdiction. The Court’s most important tools in this area
76. See, e.g., Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372–73 (2000) (summarizing
the types of preemption).
77. See generally Ernest A. Young, The Constitution Outside the Constitution, 117 YALE L. J.
408 (2007).
78. See, e.g., Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555 (2009) (drugs); Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S.
312 (2008) (devices).
79. See Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000).
80. See U.S. v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89 (2000).
81. See Young, supra note 20, at 1384–86.
82. See generally Ernest A. Young, “The Ordinary Diet of the Law”: The Presumption Against
Preemption in the Roberts Court, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 253 (2012) (surveying these cases).
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are canons of statutory construction—default rules for resolving
questions about Congress’s intent when it fails (as it often does) to make
that intent clear. Ever since the 1940s, the Court has applied a
“presumption against preemption,” requiring either clear evidence that
Congress intended to preempt state law or a clear conflict between state
law and a federal statute’s purposes.83 The presumption fits well with a
federalism theory grounded in the political and procedural safeguards of
federalism.84 By requiring Congress to speak clearly, the presumption
provides notice to members of Congress that care about state autonomy
that a proposed measure may preempt state law. And by adding an
additional drafting hurdle to federal bills, the presumption makes it a
little more difficult to enact preemptive federal statutes. 85 This is an
instance where the rules of statutory construction further the purposes of
constitutional interpretation.
3. Cooperative and Uncooperative Federalism
The third critical consideration in a world of concurrent jurisdiction is
who enforces federal law.
In the beginning, the Articles of
Confederation denied the national government any direct power to act
on individuals.86 The Confederation Congress depended on the States to
implement any laws that it enacted, much like the contemporary
European Union generally issues directives that are implemented by the
Member States. This didn’t work out well for us, partly because many
of the American states simply refused or dragged their feet in response
to Congress’s mandates. One of the key changes in the new
Constitution of 1789 was that national government gained the power to
legislate directly over individuals, without depending on the States as
intermediaries.
But the national government was still confined to its separate sphere
of enumerated powers, which were construed pretty narrowly. That
meant that the national government and the States operated pretty much
independently of one another. The Feds mostly implemented federal
laws, and state officials implemented state law. This was wonderfully
simple, and so naturally it had to change.
Nowadays the norm is “cooperative federalism,” under which most
federal programs are implemented by federal and state officials working

83. See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947); see also Stephen A. Gardbaum,
The Nature of Preemption, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 767 (1994).
84. See Young, supra note 82, at 265–69.
85. See id. at 265.
86. See N.Y. v. U.S., 505 U.S. 144, 163 (1992).
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together.87 Under the Clean Air Act, for example, the national
Environmental Protection Agency has primary responsibility for setting
standards; it issues regulations telling us how much ozone should be in
the air. But primary responsibility to enforce these standards is
delegated to the States, which must formulate and implement “state
implementation plans” that specify how each state is going to go about
meeting the federal emissions targets.88 States have significant
flexibility in this; they might mandate automobile emissions inspections,
build mass transit, impose restrictions on factories, etc. Of course, state
implementation plans have to meet many specific federal requirements,
and the national EPA supervises state implementation.
This pattern of state implementation of federal programs recurs across
the whole range of federal law, from environmental protection to
healthcare to social security. State participation is optional; as the Court
held in New York v. United States89 in 1992 and Printz v. United States90
in 1997, it is unconstitutional for Congress to “commandeer” state
legislators or executive officials by requiring them to enforce federal
law. Congress must persuade, not command, States to participate in
cooperative federalism schemes.
But States have strong incentives to cooperate.
Often state
implementation of federal programs is tied to massive grants of federal
funds. And even when it is not, States know that along with burdens of
enforcement comes the opportunity to participate in shaping federal
policy. Anyone who has ever sent a teenager to the grocery store knows
that when you ask someone else to do something on your behalf, there
will be a certain amount of slippage between your vision and theirs.
Agents inevitably have a certain amount of discretion in carrying out a
principal’s instructions; moreover, as principals become dependent on
their agents, they have to listen if the agent would prefer to do things
differently.91
Heather Gerken and Jessica Bulman-Pozen have described this
dynamic as “uncooperative federalism”—emphasizing the potential of
state officials administering federal programs to bend the rules, exercise
their discretion in a way that federal officials may not like, and even
force concessions from federal agencies.92 Think, for instance, about the
87. See, e.g., Philip J. Weiser, Towards a Constitutional Architecture for Cooperative
Federalism, 79 N.C. L. REV. 663 (2001).
88. See Dwyer, supra note 27, at 1193–97.
89. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
90. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
91. See, e.g., JOHN J. DIIULIO, JR. & DONALD F. KETTL, FINE PRINT; THE CONTRACT WITH
AMERICA, DEVOLUTION, AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE REALITIES OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM 18 (1995).
92. See Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE L. J.
1256 (2009).
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massive resistance by state educators to some of the No Child Left
Behind law’s testing requirements, which eventually forced the federal
Department of Education to change those requirements.93
To be sure, if federal officials don’t like the ways that state officers
are implementing federal program, they can generally take over the
entire program and implement it with federal personnel and resources.
But this is so burdensome as to be impracticable most of the time. One
student of mine, who wrote a lovely paper on the EPA’s ability to take
over Clean Air Act implementation, concluded that much as the U.S.
military tries to have a one-and-a-half war capability, the EPA has a
one-and-a-half state capability. EPA could, in other words, fire one
medium-sized state (say North Carolina) and maybe a little bitty one
(say New Hampshire) and implement the Act on its own in those states.
But forget about taking over for California or Texas, or for more than a
couple of smaller states at once. It seems unlikely that Congress would
support the massive expansion of resources that it would take to alter
this situation. So you can see why state implementation gives state
officials a lot of leverage over the way that federal law is enforced and
interpreted on the ground.
Sometimes, as in the case of Colorado’s marijuana policy, a state’s
decision not to cooperate in furthering a federal policy may simply mean
that federal policy can’t be pursued.94 What the Colorado example
makes clear is that, even when state and federal executive officers work
closely in tandem (as state and federal law enforcement often do), state
officials remain accountable to the state legislature and the state
electorate. This is a big part of what it means for a state to be
“sovereign” in the modern regulatory environment.95 At the end of the
day, state officials don’t work for the federal government, and this
translates into meaningful policy autonomy in a number of areas.
The variables I have discussed are not the only critical factors in a
constitutional regime where national and state authorities enjoy largely
concurrent jurisdiction over most policy areas. In particular, we haven’t
said much at all about money, and yet the allocation of authority to tax,
spend, and borrow is crucial to a healthy federal system. But in the
interests of time I want to turn instead to the last part of my talk, which
has to do with the legal and social preconditions necessary to maintain
federalism as a viable constitutional principle.

93. See JOHN D. NUGENT, SAFEGUARDING FEDERALISM: HOW STATES PROTECT THEIR
INTERESTS IN NATIONAL POLICYMAKING 195–200 (2009).
94. See Mikos, supra note 32, at 1463–69.
95. See Young, supra note 32.
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III. WHAT DOES FEDERALISM NEED TO SURVIVE?
What does federalism need to survive? We’re mostly lawyers here,
and so the obvious conclusion is that survival as a constitutional
principle requires constitutional law. And law is enforced by courts.
Hence a central preoccupation of the legal literature has been with
whether courts should enforce limits on national power through judicial
review.
A. Judicial Review
One odd thing about this debate is that few seem to doubt that the
courts should enforce limits on state power—such as the so-called
“dormant Commerce Clause”—through judicial review.96 (I’ve always
wanted to give a Coffee Talk-style exam on this topic: “The Dormant
Commerce Clause is neither dormant nor a clause—discuss!”) But the
argument for not enforcing constitutional limits on national power has
been that the political (and possibly procedural) safeguards of
federalism limit that power sufficiently without judicial review.97 That
seems dubious. We have, after all, seen a pretty inexorable expansion of
national power vis-à-vis the States over the past two centuries
notwithstanding those safeguards.
Most people who advocate
abandoning judicial review of federalism issues are simply nationalists
who do not accept that federalism is a legitimate constitutional principle
at all.98
That is not to say, however, that the political and procedural
safeguards of federalism should not shape the ways in which courts
review federalism questions. We have existing models of constitutional
doctrine designed to ensure that the political process safeguards
important constitutional principles. John Hart Ely’s famous book,
Democracy and Distrust,99 argued that courts should protect individual
rights by focusing on “representation reinforcement.” The idea was that
the political process ordinarily protects people from oppression, and
judicial review was needed primarily in those situations where politics

96. See, e.g., Philadelphia v. N.J., 437 U.S. 617 (1978) (striking down New Jersey law barring
out-of-state trash from New Jersey landfills).
97. See, e.g., JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS: A
FUNCTIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT (1980); Larry D. Kramer,
Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 215 (2000).
98. See, e.g., Edward L. Rubin, Puppy Federalism and the Blessings of America, 574 ANNALS
AM. ACAD. POLI. & SOC. SCI. 37, 45 (2001) (asserting that the “only purpose [of federalism], in the
period that followed the Civil War, was to allow the southern states to maintain their system of
apartheid”).
99. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980).
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could not be trusted to work properly—such as when the government
itself seeks to distort political debate by restricting opposition speech, or
when racial prejudice predicts minorities from forming political
coalitions. One can readily imagine a “Democracy and Distrust” for
federalism that would design judicial doctrine to reinforce political
structures that work to protect states.100 The Court’s extensive
jurisprudence of pro-federalism “clear statement rules” in statutory
construction cases is a good example. As in the statutory preemption
cases I’ve already discussed, clear statement canons provide notice to
political forces that care about federalism, and they raise another
procedural obstacle to intrusive national laws.
It seems unlikely, however, that judicial review operating alone is
enough to preserve federalism as a viable constitutional principle. We
need to think about the underlying political and sociological forces that
support federalist structures, and how likely they are to endure. I want
to talk briefly about three: opportunistic invocations of federalism;
sincere personal commitments to particular states; and a more general
commitment to the importance of process and structure.
B. The Virtues of Opportunism
The conventional wisdom among many lawyers is that no one cares
either about federalism per se or about particular states.101 I want to
question whether that’s true, but for a moment let’s assume it is. The
same conventional wisdom suggests that when people do invoke
federalism as a reason to do or not do something, it’s simply an
opportunistic move motivated by preferences about the underlying
substantive issue.102 So if I invoke federalism in opposition to
Obamacare, for instance, that must be because I don’t like public
healthcare—not because I actually care about whether it is done at the
state or federal level. A more sophisticated version holds that because
partisan alignments may differ at the state and federal level, each
political party will advocate or oppose national action based on which
level they expect to control.103
Let’s assume that all this is true. The question is, does all that
insincerity and opportunism undermine the case for federalism as a

100. See, e.g., Ernest A. Young, The Rehnquist Court’s Two Federalisms, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1,
123–29 (2004).
101. See, e.g., ROBERT A. SCHAPIRO, POLYPHONIC FEDERALISM: TOWARD THE PROTECTION OF
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 27 (2009); Rubin, supra note 98, at 45–46.
102. See, e.g., Peter J. Smith, Federalism, Instrumentalism, and the Legacy of the Rehnquist
Court, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 906 (2006).
103. See Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Partisan Federalism, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1077 (2014).
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constitutional principle. A lot of people seem to think that it does, but I
think that fails to understand the Founders’ basic thinking about
government structure. Consider Federalist 51, where Madison laid out
his basic theory of checks and balances. He began with the view that
human nature is basically selfish and unprincipled, then set out to
“supply[] by opposite and rival interests, the defect of better motives.”104
The trick to keeping the structure in balance, then, was to give “to those
who administer each department, the necessary constitutional means,
and personal motives, to resist encroachments by the others.”105 In this
way, “[a]mbition must be made to counteract ambition. The interest of
the man must be connected to the constitutional rights of the place.”
Madison was the Gordon Gecko of political theory: selfish ambition—
like greed—is good. Since we cannot count on people to believe in
federalism or separation of powers as a matter of high-minded principle,
we make sure that at least some people have selfish and opportunistic
incentives to fight for the rights of states.106
C. Federalism and Identity
I think that opportunistic reasons to protect state prerogatives go a
long way toward preserving the autonomy of the states. But I doubt it is
a complete solution. In order for the political safeguards of federalism
to work, for example, we need national politicians tasked with
representing the states to have reasons to defend not only their own
interests, but the often-distinct interests of the state government; we
need state officials tasked with implementing federal law to be
responsive to their state constituents rather than being coopted by their
federal supervisors; and we need voters to care about the state enough to
punish both their state and federal representatives when those politicians
fail to defend the state’s autonomy.
Federalism is unlikely to survive, in other words, unless significant
numbers of Americans identify with and feel loyalty to their States,
distinctly from the loyalty that they feel to the nation as a whole.107 We
do not need modern-day Robert E. Lees, who turned down command of
the Union army in order to fight for his native Virginia—but we do need
a significant number of people who care enough for their States for it to

104. FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 14, at 320.
105. Id. at 319.
106. See, e.g., Thomas H. Lee, Countermajoritarian Federalism, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2123,
2125–26 (2006); Young, supra note 19, at 1308–11.
107. See generally Ernest A. Young, The Volk of New Jersey? State Identity, Distinctiveness, and
Political Culture in the American Federal System, DUKE L. SCH. PUB. L. & LEGAL THEORY (Feb. 24,
2015), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2552866.
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affect how they vote, which politicians they support, and, in some cases,
to invest their time and attention in state governance. Madison was able
to take these sorts of attachments for granted in the late 18 th Century,
when the states were both more different from one another than they are
today and more well-established as institutional objects of allegiance
than the fledgling national government.108 And we can still take them
for granted in Europe, where the strong identification of citizens with
their Member State governments—with Britain, France, or Germany, for
instance—seems to form a strong bulwark against centralizing
tendencies in the European Union.109
In America, however, prominent academics like Edward Rubin and
Malcolm Feeley have asserted that state identity no longer exists. And
because states no longer command any particular sense of loyalty, they
say, there is no particular point in having federalism.110
There are two related but distinct issues here. First, are the states
distinctive any more, or have they basically become homogeneous?
Second, do the people of each state feel any particular loyalty to or
identity with that state? The second question is what we’re really
interested, but the puppy federalism proponents rely mostly on the first.
There’s a Starbucks on every corner whether you’re in Boston or Austin,
they say, and therefore it’s hard to imagine why anyone would care
which state they live in or feel any particular attachment to it.
It’s worth noting that this conclusion does not necessarily follow.
Consider the famous first line of Tolstoy’s novel, Anna Karenina, which
asserts that “[e]very happy family is alike.”111 No one thinks that
prevents me from identifying strongly with my family, as opposed to
someone else’s family. And anyone who’s ever been to a high school
football game can attest to the ability of the inhabitants of basically
similar communities to whip themselves into a frenzy based on their
identity with one team or the other.112
But putting that objection aside, it just isn’t true that differences
between the States have disappeared. For one thing, the catchy phrase
that there’s a Starbucks on every corner no matter where you go is false;
there’s actually a significant latte gap in this country, with states like
Massachusetts and Texas enjoying ten times as many Starbucks per

108. See Jacob T. Levy, Federalism, Liberalism, and the Separation of Loyalties, 101 AM. POL.
SCI. REV 459, 465 (2007).
109. See THOMAS RISSE, A COMMUNITY OF EUROPEANS? TRANSNATIONAL IDENTITIES AND
PUBLIC SPHERES (2010).
110. See FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 22, at 16.
111. LEO TOLSTOY, ANNA KARENIN 13 (Rosemary Edmonds, trans. 1978) (1873–1877).
112. See, e.g., H.G. BISSINGER, FRIDAY NIGHT LIGHTS: A TOWN, A TEAM, AND A DREAM (1990).
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capita as West Virginia, Mississippi, and Vermont.113 States vary
widely in size, economic prosperity, demographic makeup, and religious
affiliation.114 And one particularly interesting study, based on a robust
database of nationwide polling over an extended period of time, found
that one’s state of residence is as powerful a predictor of one’s political
party and ideology as one’s race or religion.115
What about identity and loyalty? We lack direct empirical measures.
But we do know several things. People trust state and local
governments a lot more than they trust the federal government. A recent
Pew Center survey found that 63% of Americans viewed local
governments favorably; 58% viewed state governments favorably; and
only 28% viewed the national government favorably. 116 This poll is
consistent with many other surveys over the last several years. 117 We
know that political movements have looked to state governments and
state constitutions to protect their rights on many critical issues, from
workers’ and educational rights in the 19th century to environmental and
same-sex marriage marriage rights in the 20th and 21st.118 We also know
that recent migrations from blue states to red states have not tended to
change voting patterns in the destination states, which suggests that
personal mobility tends to have more of a sorting effect than a dilution
effect on political culture.119 And we have a wide variety of cultural
evidence, from essays to fiction to music, suggesting that the American
people continue to have a love affair with their states. 120 I once tried to
string cite all the songs about Texas in a law review footnote, 121 only to
find that there are way too many to list.
No one is ever likely to conclusively prove that people identify with
113. See ANDREW GELMAN, RED STATE, BLUE STATE, RICH STATE, POOR STATE: WHY
AMERICANS VOTE THE WAY THEY DO 29–30 (2008).
114. See Young, supra note 107, at 43–59.
115. See ROBERT S. ERIKSON, GERALD C. WRIGHT, & JOHN P. MCIVER, STATEHOUSE
DEMOCRACY: PUBLIC OPINION AND POLICY IN THE AMERICAN STATES 47 (1993).
116. State Governments Viewed Favorably as Federal Rating Hits New Low, PEW RES. CENTER
(Apr. 15, 2013), http://www.people-press.org/2013/04/15/state-govermnents-viewed-favorably-asfederal-rating-hits-new-low/.
117. See Cindy D. Kam & Robert A. Mikos, Do Citizens Care about Federalism? An
Experimental Test, 4 J. EMP. LEG. STUD. 589, 598 (2007).
118. See EMILY ZACKIN, LOOKING FOR RIGHTS IN ALL THE WRONG PLACES: WHY STATE
CONSTITUTIONS CONTAIN AMERICA’S POSITIVE RIGHTS (2013).
119. See Harry Enten & Nate Silver, Migration Isn’t Turning Red States Blue, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT
POLITICS (Aug. 29, 2014), available at http://fivethirtyeight.com/features/migration-isnt-turning-redstates-blue/.
120. See, e.g., STATE BY STATE: A PANORAMIC PORTRAIT OF AMERICA (Matt Weiland & Sean
Wilsey, eds. 2009).
121. See Mitchell N. Berman, R. Anthony Reese, & Ernest A. Young, State Accountability for
Violations of Intellectual Property Rights: How to “Fix” Florida Prepaid (And How Not To), 79 TEX. L.
REV. 1037, 1039 n.1 (2001).
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their states, much less to accurately document how much that identity
has increased or declined since the Founding. But the question is simply
whether enough people care to make a political difference. And the
evidence I’ve seen so far strongly suggests that they do.
D. Process, Structure—and Lawyers
The final sociological element necessary for federalism to survive as
a viable constitutional principle takes us back to where we began.
Federalism is in the Constitution. It is an integral part of a constitution
that is obsessed with government structure and process; that has a lot
more to say about who makes the laws and how than it says about what
laws should be made. Maintenance of a federal system requires, in other
words, that Americans continue to care not just about results, but about
the structure of government and the process by which it exercises power.
As I’ve already noted, many students of politics assume that both
politicians and voters care only about the substance of policy. It’s worth
emphasizing just how implausible this assumption is. Consider Mitt
Romney, who favored public healthcare as governor of Massachusetts
but opposed replicating that program on a national scale. Or ask
yourself whether Justice O’Connor—a justice so grandmotherly that she
made her clerks carve Halloween pumpkins for the Supreme Court trickor-treat—was really in favor of guns in schools when she cast the
deciding vote in United States v. Lopez.122 It’s much more plausible that
she cared about the underlying structural issues in the case. And in any
event, why would anyone make opportunistic appeals to federalism
unless there’s an opportunity there—that is, unless there’s a meaningful
component of public opinion that might not agree on the underlying
substantive issue but might be persuaded by an appeal to structural
principles.
I want to suggest, however, that there is a particularly strong
connection between federalism and lawyers. Lawyers are steeped in
process; from the first semester of law school, we train you to care at
least as much—and probably more—about how decision-makers decide,
and by what procedures, as you care about what they decide. It is
commonplace in law school to reject a decision we agree with on the
merits because we cannot accept the way in which it was made. In fact,
the whole phrase “on the merits”—which one rarely encounters outside
the law—exists mostly because we spend so much time focused on other
considerations. One vital function that lawyers play in society is to
continually introduce this perspective into the national cultural

122. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
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conversation—through our example, our statements in public settings,
and even the way we talk about politics to our neighbors over the grill in
the back yard.
A viable federalism requires this kind of lawyerly detachment. It
requires us to oppose things we believe in, and support things we don’t
approve, because we care about the structure of governmental
decisionmaking. In law school, we create a special kind of nerd—one
obsessed with technicalities like jurisdiction, standards of review, and
procedure. William Howard Taft seems to have been that kind of nerd; it
is no doubt part of why he famously preferred being Chief Justice to
being President. That is the kind of nerd who might actually care about
federalism.
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